MAVLink is a popular micro air vehicle message format used to communicate between the ground stations and unmanned vehicles. MAVLink uses insecure radio frequency-based communications channels that are susceptible to common attacks including snooping, forgery, replay attacks, traffic analysis, and denial of service.
In response, we’ve implemented a simple custom serialization protocol called GIDL for with Ivory and Haskell backends. In SMACCMPilot, GIDL replaces MAVLink.
We have also implemented a implemented a light-weight encapsulation format that can be used with GIDL (or MAVLink) to protect against forgery, replay attacks, and snooping. The changes result in an overhead of 16 bytes of additional bandwidth use per message frame, which is potentially composed of many message. The computational overhead is dominated by encryption and decryption operations for each message send and receive.
The design constraints for the crypto is made with the following constraints in mind:
There are two distinct phases: key agreement and encapsulation. The design of both (and more details about the cryptographic work) are described in the Galois Embedded Crypto repository.